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Abstract 
In this paper, I discuss how a theoretical framework can be build to analyse social 
processes of transformation, making the link between macro and micro processes, in 
which this dichotomy can be overcome. The aim of this theoretical framework is to 
account for the transformation in societal characteristics and changes in actors’ strategies 
at micro level, in a way that links macro changes and micro processes -  the cognitive 
structures of the individual and social structures of the society. In order to build this 
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framework, I draw from the figuration sociology of Norbert Elias, the praxeologia of 
Pierre Bourdieu and the work of Michael Crozier. 
 
Introduction 
 
In this paper, I discuss how a theoretical framework can be build to analyse social 
processes of transformation, making the link between macro and micro processes, in 
which this dichotomy can be overcome. The aim of this theoretical framework is to 
account for the transformation in societal characteristics and changes in actors’ 
strategies at micro level, in a way that links macro changes and micro processes -  the 
cognitive structures of the individual and social structures of the society. However, 
this is not to be seen as a causal relation in which macro factors determine the 
behaviour of micro actors -  the framework tries to link these processes in a 
dialectical relationship.  
 
How to analyse the interplay between global forces and the actions of local actors and 
groups? Or, how to analyse the interplay between “forces of structuration” and the 
actors’ responses? How to deal with transformation as a social process in which 
agents and groups have their actions influenced but not determined by the “forces of 
competition”? In order to build this framework, I draw from the figuration sociology 
of Norbert Elias, the praxeologia of Pierre Bourdieu and the work of Michael Crozier. 
In spite of theoretical differences and divergences, sometimes very strong as those  
between Bourdieu, Elias and Crozier, these authors have used a similar concept -  the 
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concept of game -  as a methodological tool and as a metaphor to understand social 
processes.  
 
1.1 - Taking Norbert Elias and Pierre Bourdieu into organisational analysis. 
 
Elias, as well Bourdieu1, stressed the importance of methodological relationalism, 
against all forms of methodological momism that imply the assertion of the 
ontological priority of structure or agent, system or actor, the collective or the 
individual. Sociology must avoid this commonsensical perception of social reality. 
Both authors point to the origin of this problem in the structure of the European 
languages, which drives us to "draw involuntary conceptual distinctions between 
structures and processes, or between the actor and his activity, between the objects 
and relationships"2. Bourdieu similarly was concerned with transcending a number of 
conventional sociological dichotomies: the opposition between subjectivism and 
objectivism; symbolism and materiality; theory and empirical research; structure and 
agency and micro and macro analysis3. Bourdieu attempted to synthesise micro and 
macro levels of analysis without relegating analysis to either one level or the other. 
Bourdieu argued that actors are continually producing and reproducing the societal 
systems through their actions and through their interactions. “The relation between 
                                                 
1 Bourdieu’s concepts and theoretical development is heavily indebted with Elias, in spite of the fact that Bourdieu 
just few times quoted Elias. Actually, the economy of Bourdieu's references to Elias has masked the significance 
of his influence. Elias, for example, used the concept of habitus many years before it was popularised by 
Bourdieu. 
2 Elias, (1970: 113)  
3 (Wacquant, 1992: 3) 
 5
the social agent and the world is not that between a subject (or a consciousness) and 
a object, but a relation of “ontological complicity” – or mutual “ possession”. 4 
 
The consequence of seeing a society as a number of isolated objects in a state of rest 
is that we are driven to draw senseless conceptual distinctions between the individual 
and the society as two separated things. This dualism creates one of the most 
discussed problems in sociology; the relation between macro-variables and micro-
theory. Although most sociologists can the close links between them and see that 
these two categories belong together, they are often treated separately for the purpose 
of analysis.  Sociological research often concentrates on one level or another, by 
invoking the formula "other things being equal", as if this would permit to 
concentrate on either macro or micro level. However, Elias argues, as long as these 
two categories for the "purpose of analysis" are considered statistically, no links can 
be found5. Elias proposes to replace the separation between the categories micro and 
macro sociology by the use of a developmental model, in which both levels are seen 
in a state of structured flux, not only of historical flux. Elias argues that by exploring 
this alternative to the more classical models, the separation between the two 
categories becomes impossible and the unity between them can be seen.  Instead of 
conceptualising a society as it is, which is the most common way of addressing it 
according to our philosophical traditions, the task is to think of society as it becomes - 
has become in the past, is becoming in the present, and may become in the future.6 
 
                                                 
4 ( Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 20). 
5 Elias (1987) 
6 Goudsblom and Mennel (1998) 
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For Elias, social forces are forces exerted by people over one another and over 
themselves. "The task of sociology therefore includes not only the interpretations of 
specific compelling forces to which people are exposed in their particular empirically 
observable societies and groups, but also the freeing of speech and thought about 
such forces from their links with earlier heteronomous models" 7. The sociologist 
must intensely and constantly reflect, not only on the observations that s/he makes at 
the empirical level, but also on the ways of thinking and conceptualising what we 
observe.  
 
Elias refuses the idea that it is possible to clarify actual problems without looking into 
the past. His arguments in the article “The retreat of sociologists into the present” is 
an attempt to drive attention to what constitutes the present, a small momentary 
phase within the vast stream of humanity’s development”8. The present as a 
momentary phase reaffirms the idea that the past, the present and possible futures are 
embedded in each other. 
 
The consequences of these statements are not simple. When Elias places the concepts 
of individual and society inside a temporal perspective, the self loses its temporality 
within the present, because it does not start in the present, but is constructed in 
relation to the past. For him, power relations are built into the subjectivity we have 
learnt as children. Elias exemplifies this with the case of court society and its 
civilised codes of emotional and behavioural restraint. Children of courtiers learnt a 
courtly subjectivity that was itself interwoven with the power relations of the royal 
                                                 
7 ibid pg 18 
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court; they were not just built in immediate relations. The behavioural patterns of any 
society are, for Elias, "imprinted in the individuals from the earlier childhood as a 
kind of second nature and kept alert in them by a powerful and increasingly strictly 
organised self control"9. Elias argues that it is the exercise of self-control that makes 
clear perception, rational analysis, and purposeful action possible. Language and 
discursive practices provide a means of controlling the self and others through the 
deployment of symbolic forms. Scientific method, for example, provides ways of 
subjecting potentially unpredictable events to a regime of control and predictability10.  
 
To understand this civilisation process and how it affects individuals it is necessary to 
understand the concept of figuration, i.e. the network of people and institutions linked 
interdependently and simultaneously through different dimensions. Figuration 
sociology is as an invitation to disregard the analytical fragmentation which is 
characteristic of social analyses oriented by a search for variables.“ The contrast 
which is repeatedly drawn between individual and society makes it seem as though 
individuals could in some sense exist independently of society, and vice versa. This 
seems highly questionable in the light of models showing processes if interweaving. 
And it is a scientific superstition that in order to investigate them scientifically one 
must necessarily dissect processes of interweaving into their component parts.11. A 
figurational sociology helps to catch the complex causal relations involved when 
organisations underwent processes of transformation linked to societal processes of 
change. Organisations are to be seen in the light of Elias as a system of dynamic 
                                                                                                                                                              
8 Elias, 1987 
9 Elias (1994,1939: 469) 
10 Smith (1999:93) 
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forces, which involve agents situated within and outside its borders. Relations and not 
conditions need to become the empirical emphasis; processes and not structures need 
to be the focus of analysis. 
  
Since our subjectivity is linked to the changing power relations in the society where 
we live, we are in a continuous process of change interrelated with changing social 
processes. This breaks with the idea of the individual and his or her emotional and 
behavioural restraint as something that is deeply personal. It breaks with the idea of a 
“homo clausus" in organisational studies, in which an adult comes out of the blue, 
and starts his or her organisational life without any past. The relative licence for 
acting out or constraining emotional impulses corresponds to the form of integration, 
the degree and kind of mutual dependence in which people live12. Elias first worked 
with the idea of personality as a Gestalt. With inspiration from psychologists, the 
human personality was viewed as a configuration of interdependent traits. Carrying 
this view a step further, he also tried to anticipate the individual personalities as 
constituting a figuration together. Elias suggests the idea of a homines aperti, in 
which individuals and groups acquire their multiple identities (individual persona, 
gender, kin-group, occupation, religion, ethnicity, nation, and so on) through the 
experience of participating in complex social networks or ‘figurations’ shaped by 
long-term social processes13. The concept of homines aperti points to the need for an 
image of people as interdependent and interconnected, ‘the image of a multitude of 
people, each of them relatively open, interdependent processes” (Elias, 1970: 121). 
                                                                                                                                                              
11 Elias (1970:98) 
12 Elias(1939;1994) 
13 Smith (1999) 
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From this perspective it is possible to understand both our own historically formed 
subjectivity, and the way in which power relations reflect a complex interweaving of 
interdependencies amongst people. 
 
Figuration is the ongoing relations between people, the way in which they are bonded 
to each other, and therefore when a change takes place in one part of this enormous 
web, it comes to affect other parts as well, but it also encapsulates a quite long-term 
perspective. Human life is not only deeply social. This sociality works through 
interdependency networks that operate across vast long periods of time14. 
 
Elias's theory of a civilising process cannot be understood well unless the notion of 
"ego" and "social system" as two entities existing independently of each other is 
abandoned. "Individual and society do not relate to two objects existing separately 
but to different yet inseparable aspects of the same human beings and both aspects 
(and human beings in general) are normally involved in structural transformation."15 
Universal statements, and everlasting theories and social research that aim to achieve 
those characteristics are totally in contradiction to Elias' concepts. But, changeability 
is not the same as chaos. It is a special kind of order.16  
 
Elias argued that a major problem in sociology is the fact that the sociologist is an 
integrant part of the society s/he studies. Society, he writes, in spite of the fact that it 
consists entirely of individuals, is often placed in counter position to the individual. 
                                                 
14 Newton (2001) 
15 Elias, (1939;1994)  
16 Elias (1987:115) 
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This mode of thinking and expressing the society obstructs the way and may even 
prevent the sociologist from understanding the nature of sociological problems. Elias 
argues that this conceptualisation and reification must be replaced by a more realistic 
picture of persons who “through their basic dispositions and inclinations, are 
directed towards and linked with each other in most diverse ways. These people make 
up webs of interdependence or figurations of many kinds, characterised by power 
balances of many sorts, such as families, schools, towns, social strata or states … all 
these are networks of individuals. Each one of us belongs among these individuals”17.  
 
For Elias societies are only composite units in which individual human beings form 
the component parts. However, he disagrees with those who try to understand and 
explain the functioning of societies by studying the individual. Human beings can 
only be understood by the interdependencies with each other, as part of networks of 
social relations, which he called figurations. Human beings are first and foremost 
social. He uses the word people in plural, signifying that people only exist through 
relations with others. This conceptualisation has profound implications for the 
concepts of self, identity and society. The society is introduced in the formation of the 
self. The social development and transformation is undeniably linked to the 
psychogenesis. In other words, processes of social development and transformation 
can not be separated from the processes of psychological development and 
transformation. Elias see figuration sociology as a developmental or processual 
approach, that is “diametrically opposed to any tradition of social enquiry which 
                                                 
17 Elias (1970) 
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seeks to construct everlasting, universal statements about the nature of social life”18. 
Human agency needs to be seen as composed of interdependent networks, and 
therefore to analyse social processes it is necessary to look at the figurational 
development of interdependent networks and the ways in which they define power 
relations and inform subjectivity19. For Elias, human beings are embedded within 
complex figurations of social relationships, which can explain many aspects of 
human behaviour, emotions and modes of self-perception, including perceptions of 
identity and interest. These figurations change with relation to long-term social 
processes that have a discoverable pattern and structure.20 
 
When analysing the organisational transformation, the conceptualisation of the social 
interdependencies implies the identification of a network of actors who is the 
figuration. The use of this concept intends to support an approach that is more 
processual and dynamic, in contrast with expressions like “social system” and “social 
structure” which in common sociological tradition are not only very static but also 
give the impression of something separate from, beyond and outside individuals21. If 
one accepts the idea that figurations and processes have a powerful shaping effect 
upon the psychological habitus of individuals and groups22, the consequences for 
organisational research are extensive. First, organisational processes cannot be 
separated from societal processes in which people’s lives are interconnected in a 
structured way within societies and through history. Second, organisational research 
must take into consideration long-term social processes. Third, these processes have a 
                                                 
18 Rojek (1983: 586) 
19 Newton (2001) 
20 Smith (2001) 
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psychological effect that impact the way in which organisational actors control 
themselves and other actors. If different societies create different figurations and 
long-term social processes, the way in which individuals and groups control each 
other and control themselves differ and, as a consequence, organisational structures 
and forms of control can not be equalised across societies. This is not the same as 
cultural explanations to organisational divergence because culture in most of the time 
is conceptualised as a static characteristic of societies. On the other hand, figurations 
are always moving, and individuals and groups consequently will act toward each 
other in a dynamic way. A dynamic that is not chaotic, but changes in a specific 
direction.  
 
In this line of reasoning, processes of democratisation are likely to trigger 
organisational processes in which different actors will reposition themselves in the 
organisational arena. The legitimacy that actors may gain to express their demands 
brings about a shift in the type of questioning and framing of organisational issues, 
thus organisation and division of work are likely to be contested and changes are 
likely to occur. One important effect of the changes brought about by democratisation 
may also be the delegitimisation of authoritarian structures and powerful actors 
within organisations. In other societies, the feminists struggles can also have trigged 
social processes that are reflected in organisational arenas. Women are more likely to 
contest taken for granted patterns of sexual division of work, they are likely to fight 
for recognition to their demands in different fields of the social arena.  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
21 (Mennel, 1992: 251). 
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1.1.1 -  Micro and Macro relation in Bourdieu and Elias 
 
By trying to overcome the dichotomy of micro/macro, Elias as well as Bourdieu have 
been criticised for marginalizing the subjective choice in human affairs23. In the case 
of Elias, some paragraphs in his book "The civilising process" have been used to 
exemplify the criticism of him falling in the trap of a naive realist position. An 
example: "Our codes of conduct are riddle with contradictions and as full as 
disproportion as are the forms of social life, as is the structure of our society. The 
constraints to which the individual is subject today, and the forces corresponding to 
them, are in their character, their strength and structure decisively determined by the 
particular forces engendered by the structure of our society"24. The critiques come 
from those who see in the negation of structural and objective conditions the only 
way to advance social science.  
 
The concepts of involvement and detachment that he advocates are the most powerful 
evidences against  the idea that Elias can be considered a naive realist. One of his 
most remarkable contributions to sociology is his analysis of “process reduction” 
tendencies in sociology, which is the tendency to reduce everything that is observed 
and experienced as dynamic into static conceptual categories25. 
 
Bourdieu also fought against the stamp of being a structuralist. He tried to show that 
his reflexive approach shifts the analytical focus away from both structure and 
                                                                                                                                                              
22 Smith(2001) 
23 See Smith (2001), Rojek (1986 ), Jenkins (1992 ) 
24 Elias (1939: 2000 : 443) 
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subjective experience towards one of social practice. Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus, 
doxa, capital, field and reflexivity enable the development of a conceptual lens 
through which researchers can absorb the reflexive nature of social processes. Used 
in isolation, his key concepts may create a structural approach to society. However, 
Bourdieu’s key concepts should not be used and cannot be understood in isolation26; 
the concepts must be utilised in an iterative way. The more iteration is found among 
the different concepts, the better. Implicit within Bourdieu’s work is the notion that 
only through continual procedural and analytical iterations is it possible to develop an 
attempt at synthesis. Below I present these different concepts and how I use them in 
my research. To the concepts of habitus, field, doxa, capital, and reflexivity, I add 
Elias’ concept of figuration, and the concept of uncertainty in Crozier and Friedberg 
(1980). These concepts will be employed to analyse the organisation of work as a 
game among the different work groups. 
 
1.1.2 - Objectivism and Subjectivism - towards an integrated approach 
 
As exposed above, Bourdieu is critically concerned to overcome the dichotomies 
embedded in the dualism of subjectivism and objectivism. Subjectivism as defined by 
Bourdieu is “a form of knowledge about the social world based on the primary 
experience and perceptions of individuals and includes such intellectual currents as 
phenomenology, rational action theory, and linguistic analysis”27. This notion has 
                                                                                                                                                              
25 See Rojek (1986  )  
26 Garnham and Williams (1986) advice that “ fragmentary and partial absorption of what is a rich and unified 
body of theory and related empirical work across a range of fields…can lead to a danger of seriously misreading 
the theory. 
27 Bourdieu (1993:03) 
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been a dominant strand in Western Philosophy at least since the Renaissance, starting 
with Descartes and culminating with Kant postulating the innate, unchanging a-priori 
categories by which every human mind perceives the world outside itself. It is what 
Elias calls Homo Clausus, the closed person, which is difficult to resist, for it has 
entered into the mode of self-experience of people in modern societies28. Elias and 
Bourdieu challenge the static polarity between objective and subjective points of 
view.  
 
Objectivism, as understood by Bourdieu, is an attempt to explain the world by 
"focusing on the objective conditions which structure practice independent of human 
consciousness”29. The work of Bourdieu and Elias reveal that subjective experiences 
and objective structures cannot be separated and that they contour one another. Both 
tried to break with the philosophical ways of thinking, the tradition that distinguishes 
between the society “outside” and the individual mind “inside”. The concept of Doxa 
or Doxic society reveals some of the important points made by Bourdieu to overcome 
this dichotomy. 
 
In the Doxic society the ‘natural’ and social world might look as being self-evident. 
This self-evident image takes the form of a ‘political order’ which is taken for as 
granted as the natural world, “… the subjective necessity and self-evidence of the 
common sense world are validated by the objective consensus on the sense of the 
world, what is essential goes without saying because it comes without saying30. 
                                                 
28 Mennel and Goudsblom, (1998) 
29 Bourdieu (1993:8) 
30 Bourdieu (1977: 167). 
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Things are thought to be what they are and  always have been so. The question of 
legitimacy is not asked.  “… the established cosmological and political order is 
perceived not as arbitrary, that is, as one possible order among others, but a self-
evident and natural order31 . This taken for granted, the silent tradition engenders a 
“political order”, the Doxa. “The truth of the Doxa is only fully revealed when 
negatively constituted by the consideration of a field of opinion, the locus of the 
confrontation of competing discourses… The critique which brings the undiscussion 
into discussion… destroys self-evident practicality”32 However, such societies are 
exceptional. Therefore, questions concerning legitimacy are often raised. Heterodoxa 
emerges when competing discourses take place in the field of opinion “The critique 
which brings the undiscussed into discussion, the unformulated into formulation, has 
as the condition of its possibility objective crisis, which, in breaking the immediate fit 
between the subjective structures and the objectives structures, destroys self-evidence 
practically.33 Bourdieu argues that it is necessary to go beyond the description of a 
primary experience of the social world; the question of the conditions of possibility of 
a doxic experience must be raised. Here, there is a link between the investigation of a 
social process and an ethnological experience in a comparative research, “ The great 
virtue of ethnological experience here is that it makes you immediately aware that 
such conditions are not universally fulfilled, as phenomenology would have us believe 
when it (unknowingly) universalises a reflexion based on the particular case of 
indigenous relations to one’s society.”34 In researching settings that are not familiar, 
it is hard  not to suspend one’s preconception. And this experience is twofold; it 
                                                 
31  Bourdieu (1977: p166) 
32 Bourdieu(1977: 168-9) 
33 Bourdieu (1977: 168/169) 
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affects the way the researcher sees the unfamiliar as well as the way in which s/he 
sees the familiar when returns home. 
 
When Elias discussed the concept of time, he was concerned about showing how time 
and timing often become invisible to us and taken for granted. “We have slipped into 
an ever-presented sense of time. It has become part of our person. As such it becomes 
self-evident. It seems that we cannot experience the world otherwise”35. The sense of 
time also represents a figurational development that emerged in the context of the 
complex interdependencies made possible by financial credit, railways, telegraphy, 
print, etc. 
 
 
1.2 - The concepts of Bourdieu 
 
1.2.1 – Habitus 
 
The development of the concept of habitus represented to Bourdieu an attempt to 
overcome the determinism he saw in structuralism36, and was also central to his 
aspiration for developing a theory of action. “ Much of Outline as well as the 
epistemological excursions that pervade his other writing, can be read as a polemic 
against, on the one hand, phenomenological or subjectivist approaches – for 
example, social psychology or ethnomethodology – and on the other, strict 
                                                                                                                                                              
34 Bourdieu and Wacquant (1996:73) 
35 Elias ( 1992:162) 
36 Bourdieu(1986) 
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structuralism, such as that of Claude Lévy-Strauss or Louis Althusser”37. In other 
words, Bourdieu’s attempt to overcome the opposition between individual and 
society is a reaction, on the one hand,  to Sartre and existentialism and, on the other, 
to Lévi-Strauss and structuralism38. Bourdieu introduced into his analysis of practice 
the concepts of habitus, field and strategy as an attempt to overcome this fundamental 
dualism39. Habitus is conceptualised as: ”… systems of durable, transposable 
dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, 
that is, as principles which generate and organise practices and representations that 
can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious 
aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain 
them. (Bourdieu, 1990a: 53)  
 
Habitus is a set of dispositions that inclines agents to act and react in certain ways; it 
functions as a matrix of perception, appreciation and actions and makes it possible to 
achieve infinitely diversified tasks.  It reveals tendencies to act in particular ways. 
Habitus is iterative. Persons with the same and different habitus interact and 
recognise each other habitus inscribed in their reasoning, predilections, tastes and 
even in expressed emotions. It is in many instances a kind of worldview or 
cosmology held by actors. It also encapsulates skills and practical competence. It 
delineates aspirations and expectations concerning life chances and career paths.   “… 
the notion of habitus aims at eliminating: finalism/mechanism, explanations by 
reason/explanation by causes, conscious/unconscious, rational and strategic 
                                                 
37 ( Di Maggio, 1979:1461) 
38 Jenkins (1992) 
39 Jenkins (1992) 
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calculation/mechanical submission to mechanical constraints etc40. For Bourdieu, 
action is practical, pre-reflective, durable though adaptive, reproductive though 
generative. Actors are not rule followers, they need to develop strategic 
improvisations in order to respond to the opportunities and constraints opened by 
different situations. “… choices do not derive directly from objective situations in 
which they occur or from transcending rules, norms, patterns, and constrains that 
govern social life; rather they stem from practical dispositions that incorporate 
ambiguities and uncertainties that emerge from acting through time and space”41. 
 
Bourdieu had two distinct aims when developing the concept of habitus. It could 
function as a possibility to overcome the structural theory and, by complementing it 
with strategic action; it could stress the importance of agency. However, the concept 
of habitus was also a critique to utilitarian theories of human agency. For him social 
groups have not only the capability to avoid rational calculation, they do so in order 
to achieve the goals that best fit their interests, and they do so by following their 
developed dispositions or habitus.  
 
His theory is not a simple rejection of structural conditions. The habitus is also 
constructed under determined structural forces, “as 'naturally' generated practices 
adjusted to the situation, producing 'natural distinction'”42. The habitus generates 
practices, which are likely to reproduce the regularities imminent in the objective 
conditions of the production of their generating principle. It may seem deterministic 
                                                 
40 . (Bourdieu, 1990b:107). 
41 (Swartz, 1997:100). 
42 (Bourdieu, 1990b) 
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and based on French structuralism; however, Bourdieu stressed that habitus does not 
determine outcome.  Habitus is the internalisation of the objective structure, 
engendering dispositions in a dialectical relationship with history: the habitus, as a 
product of history, produces individual and collective practices, and hence history, in 
harmony with the structures engendered by history. Habitus produces behavioural 
regularities, and therefore it is linked to systematic inequalities in society. Habitus 
and social structure mutually affect and create each other in such a way that 
dispositions and social positions are mutually congruent. “Crucial in enabling 
individuals to manipulate cultural capital convincingly, habitus connotes one’s total 
social baggage. Its character varies among social fractions: it is socially valued or 
devalued by comparison with the habitus of others.”43 Persons in subordinate 
positions are often badly equipped with the dispositions that may allow them to 
successfully enter into competition with persons in dominating positions. These 
inequalities produce actions that are ”always tending to reproduce the objective 
structures of which that are the product”’44.  
 
Habitus is an acquired system of generative schemes objectively adjusted to the 
particular conditions and situations in which it is constituted. Habitus engenders all 
thoughts, all perceptions, and all actions consistent with those conditions, and not any 
other, creating a set of structured expectations––scripts––about how the world is or 
should be. 
 
                                                 
43 ( Zolberg, 1992: 198) 
44 (Bourdieu, 1972, 1977). 
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The concept would be deterministic if Bourdieu had not conceptualised the relations 
between a habitus and a field as dialectic interaction. While location in a field shapes 
the dispositions of habitus to the extent that dispositions are the product of 
independent conditions, habitus and field ”have an existence and efficacy of their own 
and can help to shape positions”45. In another attempt to conceptualise habitus, the 
presents it as ”an acquired system of generative schemes adjusted to the particular 
conditions in which it is constituted”46. Habitus is a form of cultural knowledge and 
praxis that is acquired, internalised, and interwoven - through socialisation - into the 
daily lives of an individual.  
 
The employment of a reflexive analysis implies that it is necessary to look at the way 
in which an individual understands the world – the predisposition and orientations 
that affect her relationships, actions and strategies. Habitus is a structured and 
historical social practice that regulates the social and cultural lives of any person. 
These dispositions account for the similarity in the habitus of individuals from the 
same social class (Bourdieu, 1984). It is through their own habitus that actors read 
other people’s habitus. The concept of habitus rejects the distinction between body 
and mind, habitus is inscribed in the body, and is reflected in body carriage.  Habitus 
is the person’s place in relationships, in the way they present themselves to others, 
their gestures, dispositions and tastes (Bourdieu, 1984). By being inscribed in the 
body it can be read by others, it will express the position within social relations. 
Social encounters in multicultural fields become in this sense more complicated than 
in mono-cultural environments: habitus may be misread.   
                                                 
45 (Bourdieu, 1983, p. 341) 
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Habitus creates dispositions towards who may become a friend and who certainly is 
to be seen with suspicion. The picture becomes more complicated in the case of an 
organisational field, where actors with different national backgrounds meet each 
other. There, it will be more difficult to take a position towards the other because the 
other presents a habitus that may not be easily acknowledged. If one thinks about the 
relation between habitus and cultural capital, the issue of acknowledgement becomes 
more evident as Bourdieu argues that cultural capital is incorporated.“ Most of the 
properties of cultural capital can be deduced from the fact that, in its instrumental 
state, it is linked to the body and presupposes embodiment”47. However, all these 
dispositions and embodiment are not automatic mechanisms; they can change, be 
expressed or not at different moments. As a power of adaptation  “it constantly 
performs an adaptation to the outside world which only exceptionally takes the form 
of radical conversion” (Bourdieu, 1993 :88).  
 
The concept of habitus enables an analysis of work groups as complex sociological 
and psychological processes that encompass more than materiality and social 
location. The concept of habitus is intricate, enrols ambiguities and can give rise to 
criticisms of social determinism. One of the common criticisms to the concept of 
habitus it that social reproduction seems to be inheritable and unchangeable48. 
However, another way of conceptualising habitus that avoids seeing it as determining 
structure is to conceptualise it as a generative structure, which can establish an 
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imaginative relation between the subject and the world. Otherwise, nothing could 
change; heterodoxus discourses could not be generated. Nevertheless, this generative 
structure cannot be forged and transformed by immediate self-determination because 
habitus works in a dialectic fashion, as an infinite yet strictly limited generative 
capacity 49 and it continues to operate long after the objective conditions of its 
emergence have been dislocated50. The field, as structured space, tends to structure 
the habitus, while the habitus tends to structure the perception of the field51.  The 
concepts of strategy and strategizing enter here to solve the problem of the relation 
between the habitus and the field in order to by-pass the problem of social 
determinism. Strategies are the ongoing result of the interaction between the 
dispositions engendered by the habitus and the constraints and possibilities that are 
the reality of any given social field52. The strategies are suggested by the habitus as a 
“feeling for the game”. Strategies then become objectively oriented lines of action 
constructed through practice. Yet, a strategy does not have the same meaning as for 
rational actor theorists; strategy does not refer to the purposive and calculated pursuit 
of goals53.  
 
Applying the concept of habitus to organisations led me to hypothesise that the 
workers and the managers brought to the shop floor ways of being, habitual states, 
aspirations, ambitions, predisposition, inclinations, and cognitive maps that were 
common to the members of their same group or class, and which were produced by 
the material conditions of their prior existence. Workers brought their notions and 
                                                 
49 Bourdieu (1990b: 55) 
50 (Bourdieu, 1990: 13) 
51 Bourdieu (1988:784) 
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expectations of what it means to work at a factory shop floor. Managers brought their 
notions of the ways to be a successful manager. Both reflected the values, beliefs and 
dispositions of their relatives and close social groups. Their habitus functioned as sets 
of principles for them to generate and regulate what they considered “usual” 
organisational practices. However, the notion of habitus does not support the concept 
of social class, in which there is an assumption that a social class is equivalent to the 
sum of its parts nor a social class as an objective economic relationship, which 
engenders assumptions about the normative consciousness and behaviour of 
industrial workers and employers. The encounter of actors and their different habitus 
takes place in fields which are structured spaces in which agents struggle. I discuss 
below the concept of field and its properties. 
 
 
2.3 - Power, Games and the Position of actors in the game. 
 
Power and, more specifically, balance of power form a integral part of all human 
relationships, and has been conceptualised quite differently, depending on ontological 
assumptions and consequently epistemological ones, which have lead to a myriad of 
different conceptualisations. Here I present my own. Power is relational and variable, 
cannot be reified, it has the capacity to create uncertainty in interdependent relations. 
In order to turn to clearer sociological problems, Elias uses the games model to deal 
with power relationships. He proposes the term power balances, which is more 
adequate for understanding the nexus of relationships that interdependent human 
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beings have with each other. For Elias, power balances are not only a result of 
possession of non-human objects, such as weapons and means of production; power 
balances are linked to figurational aspects, especially differentials in the degree of 
internal cohesion and communal control, which may be a decisive element in power 
ratio of one group in relation to another54.  
 
The use of the image of people playing a game as a metaphor for people forming 
societies together, makes it easier to rethink the static ideas that are associated with 
most of the current concepts used to understand social phenomena. They can be 
transformed into far more versatile concepts, which are needed to improve 
methodological tools for dealing with the problems of sociology55. 
 
What is the basis of power? Crozier and Friedberg (1963) argue that “the answer is 
obvious: the advantages, resources, and forces of each of the parties involved – or, in 
short, their respective strengths – determine the result of a relation of power”. 
Bourdieu would say that strengths are the different forms of capital.  
 
Then they argue that, in a relation of power, what is actually exchanged are 
possibilities of action. “A does not enter into a relation of power with B solely in 
order to test his strength against B’s. He has a more definitive objective: to obtain 
from B a behaviour on which his own capacity to act depends. In other words, B in 
some sense controls, by means of his own behaviour, A’s capacity to achieve his 
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objectives. The more B can bargain over his willingness to do what A wants, and the 
more his available resources allow him to keep his future behaviour from becoming 
perfectly predictable for A, then the more power he will have over A in this particular 
relation. Power, therefore, lies in the margin of liberty available to each partner in a 
relation of power. In other words, the more one partner is free to refuse what the 
other asks of him, the more power he has. Force, wealth, prestige, authority –all the 
resources, in short, which any one of the parties may claim- play a role only to the 
extent that they provide a greater freedom of action.” (ibid:32) 
 
People in organisations struggle to control the level of uncertainty over their future 
actions. Uncertainty thus becomes the main source of power and consequently the 
motivation for hidden confrontation. Any person in an organisation takes advantage 
of uncertainties and rules in his/her own interest56. As Crozier suggests, even in 
circumstances of dependence and constraint, agents do not adapt passively, they may 
make active use of regulations and formal procedures, which appear at first sight as a 
constraint, but can be diverted from its original intention and used as a protective 
device against the superior57. “Power is a reciprocal, but unbalanced, relation. Its 
reciprocity derives from the fact that negotiation always involves exchange. If one of 
the two parts involved has no further resources to commit to the relationship, it no 
longer has anything to exchange, hence it cannot enter into what may properly be 
called a relation of power”58.  
                                                 
56 This contradicts the Weberian notion of  domination. In Weberian terms, power is conceptualised as “the 
instrument of `structures of domination', whose objective is to construct, justify and stabilise the obedience of 
people. Courpasson (2000: 143).  
 
57 Crozier and Friedberg (1977:18 
58Ibid 31 
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The possibility that a centralised and legitimised authority can take place in an 
organisation is put into question by Crozier and Friedberg, “A given organisational 
situation never completely constrains an actor. He always retains a margin of liberty 
and negotiation. This margin of liberty (signifying a source of uncertainty for his 
partners as well as for the organisation as a whole) endows each actor with power 
over the others, which increases with the relevance for these others of the source of 
uncertainty controlled by the actor. This relevance is to be understood as the extent 
to which the source of uncertainty affects the capacity of the other actors to play 
according to their strategies” 59.  Even in the most extreme situations, an actor 
always keeps a minimum of liberty.  
 
Games for Elias and Bourdieu are not intentionally created. In the case of 
organisational games they should not be seen as intending to create relative 
satisfactions, which reduce the strain of an “endless series of meaningless motions”60. 
Games take place and are neither independent of nor in opposition to management61. 
Games take place in different forms and with distinct objectives, with different 
stakes, rules and norms, but they are always present.  
 
For Bourdieu, in order to understand the game being played, it is necessary, first, to 
make an analysis of the position of the field vis-à-vis the field of power. Second, it is 
necessary to map out the objective structure of the relations between the positions 
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held by the different players who compete for the legitimate form of specific 
authority in the field. Third, the habitus of the different players need to be analysed to 
grasp the different systems of dispositions they have developed by internalising a 
determinate type of social and economic condition.62 
 
Elias points out that the 'players' in increasingly complex networks gradually alter 
their positions in the course of the game, and advises that, to understand it, the game 
cannot be reduced to individual moves. The assimilation of events progressively leads 
to the development of more impersonal concepts that take more account of the 
relative autonomy of the players than of the motives of individual players. However, 
it is worthwhile to remember that the course of the game is uncontrollable for the 
players themselves. The course of the game cannot be reduced to the actions of 
individual players, because it results from the mutual dependency among the players, 
from being interdependent as players and from the tensions and conflicts that go 
along with this.63 To complement this, it is necessary to be aware that the game is 
also embedded within larger social processes of transformation. To develop a 
figurational approach to social games is to be aware of the constantly shifting nexus 
of interdependent forces. There is the assumption in the figurational sociology that 
nothing in the social world is constant in the way natural scientists have come to use 
the term.  
 
1.4 - Summarising the theoretical approach  
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My intention in exposing all the concepts that I draw from Bourdieu, Elias and 
Crozier was to construct a framework of analysis to investigate organisational 
processes. I have presented how the metaphor of game can be used to understand 
organisational processes, and how it fundamentally helps to integrate the different 
concepts that I use from different authors. The use of the concept of habitus (in 
Bourdieu and in Elias) can be a way to bridge the gap between the attempt to uncover 
the games that are being played and to understand the social construction of the actors 
that are playing them. The feel for the game for Bourdieu ”is the social game 
embodied and turned into a second nature”64. When using the metaphor of social life 
as a game, I assume that different groups possess different habitus that provide them 
with ‘a feel for the game’ that  affects the way in which they understand and perceive 
the social world.  
 
Within a complex organisational structure there is likely a variety of groups with 
different levels of education, access to information, and economic possibilities (in 
Bourdieu’s words with different amounts of total capital) that will facilitate and 
constrain their strategic action, or in Crozier words, their possibilities to create 
uncertainty. In order to understand organisational processes, the game models are 
useful because they reveal that the outcomes of the complex interweaving of actions 
of different agents may lead to outcomes which no single player or group of players 
intended. As the number of players and the complexity of the game increase, and as 
the power differentials between the players diminish, so the course of the game 
becomes increasingly volatile and beyond the ability of any single individual or group 
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of players to control. The use of the Doxa as a method of analysis helps to understand 
how different actors see the world, it helps to understand how action is legitimated 
and how disparities of power between social appear to be facts of nature.  
 
Bourdieu have been criticised for producing a kind of pessimism/fatalism and an 
unavoidable reproduction of existing patterns of thought and action. I try to solve this 
problem by developing a theoretical approach that emphasise not the either/or of 
agency and structure, but the both/and, recognising not only their mutual constitution, 
but also the need to examine the interrelationships between them65.  
 
Bourdieu’s concepts are not so clear to assess how agency is created in organisational fields. 
Crozier concepts helps to understand the degree of autonomy that actors have. Crozier points to 
the relations of power and how actors are fighting for gaining power that in Bourdieu’s 
praxeology is capital. Crozier’s understanding of the relationship between power and uncertainty 
enters here as a possibility to investigate the strategies of the actors in order to create uncertainty. 
But, this is to be done by analysing first the figuration that is formed by the interdependencies 
among actors in the factories. By using Crozier I try to see the games inside the figuration that are 
formed among the distinct actors. Crozier showed that it was necessary to be careful when 
analysing the functioning of firms in terms of power struggles and actors' strategies. He argued 
that it is necessary to play attention to 'the series of social controls that prevent people from 
taking too much advantage of their own strategic situation'66 However, he lacked a concept of 
actor that could match an analysis conducted in terms of strategic games. Bourdieu’s concepts 
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give the possibility to uncover which kinds of tools (capitals) different actors and groups may use 
in order to create uncertainty in a specific figuration. In this way the concepts of Crozier and 
Bourdieu complement each other. Elias demonstrated that macro-societal developments and 
behaviour changes at the micro-level are interrelated, inviting for a multileveled, historical 
perspective to analyse organisations. Thus, Elias’s perspective in organisation studies implies 
attention to the long-term development of managerial, craft and worker habitus. 
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